Recall this Book 96
Lorraine Daston (JP,EF)
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John Plotz:
From Brandeis University, welcome to Recall this Book where we assemble scholars and writers from different disciplines to make sense of contemporary issues, problems, and events. Let's start today with a riddle game. You follow them unthinkingly. Which may mean the time that you think about them is when you wanna break them. They seem to mean something far different for other people than they do for you. And yet when you come to say why it’s a challenge, like time, you understand them if nobody asks you about them, but the minute you try to define them, you get tongue tied. What are they? Well, if you guessed my parents, you get half credit, but the real answer is rules. And today’s guest, Lorraine Daston has just written a breathtaking new book about them. Not content with simply distinguishing rules from laws, this book proposes a tripartite structure, a taxonomy that divides all rules into, and we’re gonna come back to these three: laws that govern, Models that teach and most discussion worthy for our era of big data, algorithms, which calculate and measure.I’m John Plotz, hello. I study science fiction and I’m joined as usual by our anthropological ruler. ruler in oh so many senses, Elizabeth Ferry. Hello, Elizabeth. Okay, and once again, our RtB virtual guest today is the eminent, the preeminent. I said it before and I’m sticking to it, the preeminent historian of science, Lorraine Daston who last spoke with us at the height of the pandemic for our series on Books in Dark Times. So hello again, Raine

Lorraine Daston:
Very nice to be with you both.

John Plotz:
It’s wonderful to have you. So, Lorraine Daston’s works are too numerous to list here, but they include the utterly transformational book Objectivity co-authored in 2017 with Peter Gallison. I just spent an hour talking about it with
my graduate seminar this morning, so I have it on the brain. And an edited collection with Elizabeth Lundbeck (this is just an example, but it's one I love) *Histories of Scientific Observation* in 2011, and Raineas you know, we each have many thoughts about this wonderful multi folate book, but the format with a new book under discussion is to invite our author to start by laying out what seems to you the key questions or key claims of the book, and we'll respond on our thoughts and questions that arose from our own encounter, and the conversation will go from there. So handing the floor over to you.

Lorraine Daston:
And, and as an aside, I too really love the co-authored books. Mm-hmm. The rules book began with an everyday observation of the dazzling variety and ubiquity of rules. It's been a commonplace of ethnography and travel literature since at least the time of hiatus. That every culture has rules, but they're all different rules. And Herodotus has some famous passages about the Egyptians that dramatize that contrast. But I was looking for something more structural about the kinds of rules. And as you said in your introduction, John, I settled on three major meanings of rules, two of which are still very much with us: rules as laws and rules as algorithms. And a third meaning, which was predominant for most of the term's history, at least in the Western tradition until the end of the 18th century, mainly rules as models and I set out to trace. Both what happened to rules as models, but also the rise and rise of algorithms. A word which didn't even have an entry in the most comprehensive mathematical encyclopedia of the late 19th century, but now, of course rules us all. So my attempt was to try and track these three kinds of rules but to pay very close attention because I am a historian to the concrete particulars. So I cast my nets very wide. I looked at cookbooks, I look at rules of horror. I looked at rules of games. I looked at rules of monastic orders. I looked at traffic regulations, sumptuary regulations, spelling rules and of course algorithms for how to calculate. And I suppose if there's one take home message from the book, it is a distinction between thick and thin rules. Thick rules are rules that come upholstered with all manner of qualifications, examples, caveats and exceptions. They are rules which are braced to confront a world in which recalcitrant particulars refuse to conform to universals.
Versus thin rules of which algorithms are perhaps the best prototype which are rules which are formulated without attention to circumstances. They all rules are in the imperative that these rules brook no quarter, they offer no sense of a variable world. And as I said algorithms are perhaps the example. Most present to mind, but many bureaucratic rules, especially bureaucratic rules in their kafkaesque exaggeration also fit this description. And the arc of the book is to describe not how thick rules became thin rules, because we have thick and thin rules around us all the time. But rather where thick rules are necessary, where you must anticipate high variability and the need to tweak your rule to circumstances and where thin rules. In exceptional cases, at least historically, cross-culturally seen where thin rules can actually get a job done because one can standardize the context and keep it stable.

John Plotz:
Though you do end one of your chapters, and this is one of the lines that I really loved. It's a discussion of, well, of its chapter eight about bending and breaking rules. You say behind every thin rule is a thick rule, cleaning up after it.

Lorraine Daston:
Yes. I had a very vivid mental image conforming to that sentence, which was of the poor moderators at what was once Facebook having to undo the damage done by the Facebook algorithms. And it was exactly that kind of backstage cleaning up, which laid behind that sentence when I wrote it. But I think it's a much more general problem, and that is that Thin rules have a bad conscience, that is they're never as thin as they pretend to be. And we are always applying them with a kind of mauvaise foi because anyone, for example, anyone who teaches and all of us who teach are always confronted with students who have special circumstances special needs, and are asked whether or not the rules can somehow, If not be bent or broken, be contoured to that case. That is, we're all casuists at heart and we're casuists at heart pretending to administer thin rules. So there's always a sense of subterranean thick rules behind the thin rules that we are allegedly enforcing or obeying.
John Plotz:
I think that connects and Elizabeth, sorry, I don't wanna hog the mic here, but I think that connects to a very interesting set of arguments I hear you making about the category of judgment as well. How judgment comes to be associated with subjectivity, but that, that's maybe a misunderstanding of the intersection of general in particular, that that calls out, that, that calls out for judgment rather than judgment proceeding from. Idiosyncrasy or caprice on the part of the judger?

Lorraine Daston:
You know, it's, this is a really interesting historical development. Starting in the late 17th century in the 18th century, you begin to see a deepening distrust of the exercise of judgment and perhaps most spectacularly, although this is not an area that I dwell upon in this book, in the area of theology. So that not, not even God is allowed any longer to make exceptions Although theologians of course, always hold out the possibility that God could perform a miracle, in fact, they emphasize that he does. So very rarely because he sets more store by the uniformity and universality of his administration of the universe than he. By the extravagant exception this is carried to the point that when the Lisbon earthquake kills some 15,000 people and absolutely levels the city and becomes a philosophical scandal. Throughout Europe medications, Voltaire Candide amongst other complaints about how God is administering the universe. Someone like Benjamin Franklin can say, well, it's very unfortunate for the people of Lisbon, but by that disorder, the earth has churned up materials otherwise hidden. That would be rare and valuable for human use. And it is the case also that ministers in Northern Europe noticed that the water table had risen as a result, they thought of the Lisbon earthquake. So this is a God whose mercy has become statistical. This is no longer the God who attends not of Sparrow Falls, but, but God attends. So even in that realm, even God's judgment is seen as increasingly rule bound. And increasingly Not susceptible to deviations, even in a very good cause.

Elizabeth Ferry:
So I have a question about your argument with respect to, to thick and thin rules. And partly it's because you mentioned Michael Polanyi, but I kept thinking about his brother Karl Polanyi. And particularly the idea of embeddedness that Polonyi talks about, which is a kind of thickness, right? I mean, he's talking about it with respect to markets. And the ways in which things that we that economists conceptualize as the laws of the market exist within a kind of formal universe that at least makes the claim to be disembedded. There's an argument about the sort of the great, what he calls the great transformation, right? This sort of moment movement from embedded to disembedded, not necessarily in an evolutionary sense and in a teleological sense and not, not always. Sometimes more ideological than actual, but do you see something. I mean, I got, there's a suggestion in the book too that at least aspirationally there's a historical movement from thick to thin rules.

Lorraine Daston:
So *aspirationally* is indeed the word that ought to be italicized here. Right. But, and, and I started off with very much that narrative in mind. I think especially for historians of science, there's an almost irresistible magnetism to them, we are marching toward modernity, narrative. But I ended up, and this was in part because by chance I was finishing the book in the midst of the pandemic realizing that this was not an irreversible historical evolution, on the contrary. At any moment a world of thin rules just in time supply chains can collapse, right? In the face of a planetary pandemic in this case. Perhaps a hurricane of no, right. Last five, category five hurricane. That in fact, what one is seeing is a kind of archipelago of islands. Of stability and uniformity, often guaranteed by standardization. Which these islands are the. Very protected eco-topes in which thin rules can arise. And they're always fragile, right? They're always precarious. And many of them depend on physical infrastructure. So for example probably the most important steps toward regularizing traffic in early modern cities was the creation of sidewalks, for example, that separated pedestrian traffic from first horse and carriage traffic, and later bicycle, and then later car traffic. So there's a physical story to be told as well about how Rules are stabilized, or to use the metaphor of thick and thin, how thick rules are put on the diet to become thin rules.
John Plotz:
But your discussion of thinness here seems very connected to your discussion of the rise of the algorithm in preference over other rules and, and I was thinking of your three sets of rules as kind of a triangle, which was somewhat independent of thickness and thinness. But now that I hear you talk, I'm thinking that the algorithm and thinness may line up together. So I'd love to hear your thoughts about that.

Lorraine Daston:
Okay. So historically that ends up being the case. Yes. That is the term that added crem, but it's not, i, I, in the long, long history of algorithms, so, you know, the most fundamental algorithms are the operations of arithmetics, Mm-hmm., subtraction, multiplication, and division. And in the long, long history of algorithms all over the world with great mathematical traditions they have a very. Thick texture often. It's often the case that they are taught by lots and lots and lots of examples. A rule might be articulated in bare bones fashion, but nobody learns it that way. It's incomprehensible, frankly. And if you think back to the way in which you learn, for example, you know how to solve two equations and two unknowns in high school algebra. You'll remember certain kinds of problems as train problems or bathtub problems and the like. Yes. That's because the way in which we learned to solve those problems and to recognize that that was that kind of problem was doing many, many, many examples. Yes. So this is not a genre which has disappeared and that is algorithm. Dressed up like the Michelin man, you know, cushioned. Yeah. With lots and lots of examples. It's only when calculation starts to become mechanical in the mid 19th century that you begin to get what seems to be an unbreakable association between thin rules, algorithms, and rigidity because the faculty of judgment, which is needed, To tweak a thick rule or a thin rule to fit circumstances is not accessible to either the machine with levers and cranks, which is computing actuarial tables or astronomical tables, or later to the electronic computer.

John Plotz:
So that Raine that leads in so nicely. Thank you very much to my second question, which was to actually to ask about the relationship of this book to the argument that you put forth in objectivity, but elsewhere as well about the rise of epistemic virtues. And as a 19th century person, it makes sense that I would focus on this, but you know, as I was discussing with my students you have an argument about the preference for objectivity over reason judgment as a, as a kind of norm of scientific certainty in the 19th century. And I'm wondering so is your argument here, Does it effectively contain that objectivity argument within it? Or how do you see them?

Lorraine Daston:
It's certainly very much shaped by the many, many, many discussions that Peter Gallison and I had about mechanical objectivity and its procedural quality. And I suppose what's missing from both objectivity and from this book is an account of the negative associations of the. So, you know, the root of arbitrary is simply an act of. And its associations are of anything quite positive really up until about the 16th and 17th century. And it starts to take on a distinct odor of whim and caprice, often cruel, whim and caprice in the political theory of the 17th century. So John Locke, writing in the second treatise on government can think of nothing, nothing more intolerable than to be subject to the arbitrary will of another. Arbitrary will being somewhat repetitive because arbitrary is always about the exercise of will, but the *ipso facto* assumption is that all exercises of will as an act of will is somehow unjustified, excessive, and a form of the unacceptable exercise of power in the most extreme case of Master over Slave.

John Plotz:
So can I ask, and this is maybe asking you to do my own homework for me, since it's about aesthetics, but there is a story that we tell on the aesthetic side about the rise of discourses, that prize subjectivity in the 19th century. Like romanticism would be the most straightforward example. But you know, I teach Victorian novels and you know, the notion of, you know, women coming into a form of consciousness, which is defined by having capacity to act on their own. And that I take the point about the arbitrary or the capricious, but it
does, there is a prizing of the, yeah, the space of the interior. How does that fit into this? Is that a, is. Backflow or anomaly or?

Lorraine Daston:
I don't think it's an anomaly. I think that's what's created. Often, I think on a very gendered pattern. Yes. It's a kind of yin yang of objectivity and subjectivity. You see this explicitly amongst the scientists. Those are the texts that Invest in, which someone like Claude Bernard the great 19th Century French experimental physiologist says, you know art is subjective, science is subjective. So it's a dividing of the territory between them. And in the context of literature, especially romantic literature. The arbitrary is never judgment actually, but the arbitrary blurs into the spontaneous. And indeed into the exercise of free will, and since its counterpoint, Scientific naturalist doctrines of determinism. The only way actually to exercise free will is for it to erupt like a volcano with no apparent change of causation leading up to it.

John Plotz:
I mean, really this is for people who haven't read the book. You have an argument about the rise of the algorithm, which like, as in your case, of the laws of arithmetic, you're saying predate the current fancy pants technology that we have. But what is your chicken and egg thought about how the technologies, like, are the technologies in a forcing bed because people come to prize algorithms more, or do the technologies come along and make algorithms more attractive? And therefore the thinking of the culture tends more towards the algorithmic,

Lorraine Daston:
The algorithm as a definition of a rule is number three or four, usually in dictionary definitions, well through the 19th century, so that there's something that happens, I think really after, in, after the, in the post-war period and perhaps even after the spread of personal computers. In the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, which is not only an enormous amplification of what algorithms are applied for, but also it becomes something which is almost a prosthesis for us. So that I think a great deal of our ways of thinking
are now being shaped by the hours and hours and hours that we spend interacting with these algorithms and perhaps, The most intuitive way I can think of to make this vivid is learning Google search, how to search for something on Google as opposed to a classical index. And anyone who grew up with classical indices knows that you would have known something of yeah that's not the way to look for something on, on, on Google. So that, and almost without realizing it, are syntax of search, the way in which we're formulating. Questions for searches has been altered through long interaction. I mean, this is hardly the first time that such technologies have infiltrated our ways of thinking. Writing for example is the most obvious. Reading and writing. Yes, obvious as well. But it's become what it is sometimes called a cultural technique, which is more than just a technique. It's more than just a tool, it becomes a way of thinking.

Elizabeth Ferry:
I was really interested in the description of the cookbooks and the rules in cookbooks and especially the, you say something about sort of there, there's kind of no claim. These early modern cookbooks. There's sort of no claim to generalization and there's a kind of imminence of the rule.

Practice and especially, and you don't, you don't say as much about this, and this is where I'm curious about the kind of the practice of the body.

Lorraine Daston:
In the case of the cookbooks we're told more or less explicitly especially in the early cookbooks, say the cookbooks of the 17th century, that these are books which are meant not for rank beginners but for people who've already undergone an apprenticeship, who have a deed mastered at the elbow of a master cook, the bodily movements to fold in egg whites into a room properly mm-hmm. Or to know how to candy orange peel and, and the like. And what you see, and this is a kind of trace, I think, of those bodily practices, that the cookbooks become ever more idiot-proof. So the early cookbooks are really quite sparse on procedural instructions. They tell you the ingredients, they're extremely finicky about the ingredients. There are some quantities as well.
Whereas the cookbooks, which are addressed to a broader and broader audience quite explicitly, and in opposition to the cookbooks meant for the Apprentice who wants to become a master, Those cookbooks tell you things like not only should you, if you're making a boiled pudding, stir the pot now every now and again to make sure the bag containing the ingredients does not stick to the bottom, they even tell you don't use a soapy bag, which no previous cookbook would've thought it needed say, right?

Elizabeth Ferry:
And tie it loose for this and tight for this and

Lorraine Daston:
Yeah, that's right. Exactly. Exactly. So, and all of those are of course, gestures And I suppose a question of a sort of Michael Polanyi sort is, If you didn't already know how to fold egg whites into a roux, could you learn by reading Julia Child, for example? I suspect not, and that returns to the questions about models, which is I suspect that what's going on is a very much as in the earlier animal is of rule following is a simultaneous implicit and explicit crystallization of rules. So it's important that the rule be set down in explicit form as a kind of guide rope, but it has to be supplemented by the model, the implicit form. And I think even though it's very difficult to find traces, textual traces of this or visual traces of this, I'm sure that's also going on with the rules of monastic orders. Mm-hmm., that there is a physical patterning of posture of the monks following that of the Abbott. I'm sure you've observed this as I have that graduate students who are in the, under the sway of a charismatic professor start to dress as she does or start to, there are certain mannerisms which are unconsciously imitated. I think that this is all simply a further illustration of this process.

John Plotz:
Yeah. In fact, you have a wonderful line about that Raine that I was thinking might be a good bridge to where we are now, which is the notion of rules as models that, models that teach, I mean the par, the emulative rule following.
And one, you don't talk a lot about childhood here. These are mostly examples of adults. But you do at one point say, children understand intuitively how to follow but not ape their parents' example. And I feel like that, and interestingly, the point you were just making about micro gestures sort of goes on to the *aping*. Elizabeth and I were at Hopkins where there were a lot of graduate students who were aping their professors. But, maybe you could say more about that notion of following without aping. That, that, to follow an example is to mimic, like we have all these words like *ape* and *mimic* that diminish emulation, but that there's this other form of valorized emulation.

Lorraine Daston:
Right. Exactly. And we, we've lost I think a vocabulary which is a more discriminating one about these forms of following as opposed to making an exact facsimile. I dunno what you think about this genre as a literary scholar, but it seems to me that genres are doing this work. So the *I* need is not an imitation of the *Iliad* and *Paradise Lost* is not an imitation of either of them, but you can see that they belong in a family lineage and Milton has internalized both *the Iliad* and *the Aeneid* in deep ways. I, I don't know very much about this, but I've read really fascinating work by the philosopher Arnold Davidson on it, on musical improvisation. Which strikes me also as in a different medium, very similar in which there are recognizable themes, but then there are, there's an enlargement of the possibilities without losing the motif of the original theme, theme and variations of one kind or another. And I, you know, I don't know about, this is completely amateur, but in watching children I see something very similar going on and. It seems in a sense, essential for the child to realize not only what is the rule in this circumstance, but how do I know in which domain to apply this rule. And, and that yes is learned through, I think, model following.

John Plotz:
Can I just follow up on that to connect, I mean, I kept thinking about saints lives and also Jesus as emulatable general more generally speaking, and the waxing of that as a paradigm. So I guess one question is to think of a specifically about the religious dimensions of that, if genre is like a secular
form, what the religious forms is. But then I guess another question about that is to ask, I think this is another version of the discussion we've been having about the rise of thin rules. Has emulation actually gone away from the religious sphere?

Like do we not still have that as a paradigm? How religions are modeled. I mean, maybe we don't, I mean, the examples that you gave of things like Ben Franklin would suggest we've turned God into the clockmaker or something. But I do feel like there's some forms of religion nowadays that are still emulative in there.

Lorraine Daston:
Right. I agree. I think, I think that, I think imiatatio christi, you know, what would Jesus do? Yeah. Is still very much yeah, one form, but, but interestingly a form which is, which cannot cannot be a mimicking, I mean, Oh, didn't, did not find himself in the situations that we find ourselves. He's never had, I suppose he did have to worry about cheating on his taxes render to Caesar what's Caesars. But, there, I, I assume that there are lots of modern dilemmas of the sort that people write into the New York Times ethicist about, that Jesus never encountered in first century CE Galilee. And that therefore what we are doing. Is exactly this kind of emulatory model following, which is we are extrapolating somehow. Yeah. A model in our heads and imagining mutatis mutandis what would be the way to behave here. It's interesting. The Catholic church has a very wise doctrine which is we are to admire saints, but not to emulate them because they realized, especially in the case of female saints, that life would come to a halt.

If everybody decided that they wanted to be a saint, because the first thing the Saints do is decide they no longer have time to do the household chores. Yes. They have bigger fish to fry and a kind of Mary and Martha like dialogue. So right. Certain limits were put to how you should use the, the Saints Vita. Right, right. Well, it is what would Jesus do? Not what did Jesus do? Hmm. Right. Exactly. Which requires exactly this extrapolation, which is what's going on with model following.
Elizabeth Ferry:
Oh, sorry. I just had a quick story that the discussion about children just reminded me of a kind of searing early memory of being in grade school and doing a play, acting Out a little scene. And in the middle of the scene I forgot that it was a play and I thought we were playing. So I said, oh, let's pretend something. And the other kids got, went down on me so hard. I'm still like, ashamed about it. Like years later. Yes, yes. It was clearly like I just forgot, like, which kind of a context am I in here?

Lorraine Daston:
And it's so interesting what you say though about how ferociously the other kids responded because they're, they're there really, there, there is a kind of, Earnestness with which children take whatever rules have been established for a context. There is a psychologist very autocratic, very interesting work by Michael Tomasello, a developmental psychologist who has looked at what happens with children and they're quite savage. You know, when they see violations of rules unless they are told in the make believe scenario, they're asked to judge that the child is a newcomer and doesn't know the rules yet. They're capable of moderating their disapproval.

John Plotz:
So that I, oh man. In another version of this conversation, which I think will last, we're probably turning towards the final sections of it now, but we could pursue the Huizinga Homo Ludens, you know, that notion of demarcated spaces. I'm gonna steal space to ask this question. The description you have of the islands of stability, how would it consort with Huizinga’s argument in Homo Ludens about what he calls these sacred spaces apart? You know, the notion that what games do is provide a well regulated space, which is at once fully realized and also understood to be fictional. Right. Those are rules.

Lorraine Daston:
Yeah, I mean that book is a brilliant book. It's one of my favorite books of all time. Yeah. But and I absolutely agree that the game to, in, in some ways the
prototype of these islands of stability and uniformity I'm talking about they are the enclosure of a protected world amidst all of the un-tidiness and disorder and unpredictability of the real world.

John Plotz:
Yeah, that's incredibly helpful because it, like I remember, Huizinga again makes this crucial distinction between a cheat and a spoil sport. He says A cheat is somebody who's consonant with the rules of the game. Like you can understand wanting to get an extra point, but the spoil sport is the person who like walks across the lines without admitting that they're lines. Much more an existential threat, right?

Lorraine Daston: No, the spoil sport is the anarchist, absolutely.

John Plotz:
So I think this is a great moment then to turn to this final section called Recallable Books where each of us names at least one older book could be ancient, but could just be 20th century. In fact, even 21st century books have been named that those who enjoyed this conversation might enjoy. So can I ask you, give us a Recallable book.

Lorraine Daston:
Okay, so I said I had. Two. Yes. One of the Rules of St. Benedict, which is the sixth century set of precepts for how to run a monastic order, and which is still being followed in monastic communities, you know, in Arizona, in Monte Casino in Italy. And it's pretty typical of these thick rules. Yes. And the other is the Joy of Cooking. Ah, which, you know, the archetypal idiot proof cookbook with which many of us grew up.

John Plotz:
Oh, that's fantastic. Thanks. Amazing. You know, I'm writing about the Canticle for Liebowitz, which is a post nuclear apocalyptic novel by, and I don't know if you if you know this, but Walter Miller himself was involved in the bombing of Monte Casino, and so he then imagines a Benedictine monastery in Arizona,
in fact. where even the nuclear apocalypse could be survived. But there's some kind of compensatory logic vis-a-vis Benedictines specifically, so.

Lorraine Daston:
No, I didn't really, I didn't know he had been involved in that.

Elizabeth Ferry:
Yeah, so, so I love the, the, you pick the Joy of Cooking and especially because it's, right, it's, it's from following the rules that the joy emerges, right? So it's sort of perfectly captures this, this kind of interplay of creativity and, and, you know, delightful chaos and rules. So I, as usual, I've changed my mind in the middle of our conversation. And now I wanna suggest George Perec Life, A User's Manual. Mm. Which is a novel of a hundred chapters in which each chapter is a room in a large Parisian apartment house that the concierge is carefully going through. And, Perec was a member of I believe it's called the Ulapo Movement, which is yes, a movement that, of writing that imposes definitely arbitrary rules, or at least in some sense, arbitrary, although.

There is, you know, some lack of arbitrariness is usually imminent. But you know, that sort of sense of this kind of, you know, seeming rigidity and, and formula that kind of opens out each room is this sort of perfect little world of particularity that's existing within, within this rule. So, that's mine.

John Plotz:
Hmm. That's great. And Raine this sort of this follows off your answer about the power of caprice and also the gendered nature of subjectivity in the 19th century, but it also relates, I thought, to your wonderful point about genre and the way that genres contain emulation without imitation. And so it's Dostoyevsky's Notes from Underground.

And specifically I'm thinking of the moment where this sort of unnamed narrator who is basically just kind of i, I would say soliloquy, but I think ranting might be a better word. He's sort of ranting at us, his imagined
reasonable listeners, and he says, but “dammit gentlemen, sometimes two plus two equals five is a nice thing as well.” So I think that it, it really gets at your point of like how we valorize, you know, to, to valorize the will and contradistinction to the rule. I think there’s genre stories there too, of what Dostoyevsky is sort of pushing back against, or both pushing against and building on, I suppose, in terms of prior genres.

Mm-hmm. Wow, that’s a wonderful set of recalled books. Thank you so much. I gotta, I gotta go grab my copy of Joy of Cooking right now. So Raine, this has been a real pleasure. So on behalf of Elizabeth and, and our listeners, thanks for taking the time to beam in.

Lorraine Daston:
Oh, it was delightful to talk with both of you.
It was great fun. Thank you.

John Plotz:
Great. And so if you have enjoyed this conversation to your listeners, please check out the Recall this Book archives at our website, including Rinnie’s earlier appearance during the pandemic in the Books in Dark Times series. And thank you all for listening. Recall this Book was founded by Elizabeth Ferry and me, John Plotz. It is sponsored by Brandeis and the Mandel Humanity Center. Sound Editing is by Naomi Cohen, website Design and Social Media by Miranda Peery of the English Department. We’re eager to hear your comments, criticisms, and thoughts. If you liked what you hear, please subscribe, rate, and review us on Apple Podcast, or wherever you get your podcast From all of us here at RtB, thanks for listening.